

# Fuzzy Data Analysis Possibilistic Networks

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Oil contamination of water by trading vessels

Typical formulation:

"The accident occurred 10 miles away from the coast."

Locations of interest: *open sea* (z3), 12-mile zone (z2), 3-mile zone (z1), *canal* (ca), *refueling dock* (rd), *loading dock* (ld)

These 6 locations  $\Omega$  are disjoint and exhaustive

 $\Omega = \{z3, z2, z1, ca, rd, Id\}$ 

Statements are often not simply true or false. Decision maker should be able to quantify their "degree of belief". This can be an objective measurement or subjective valuation. The standard way to model such situations with uncertainty is to use probability theory:

Sample space  $\Theta$  (finite set of distinct possible outcomes of some random experiment), Events of interest are subsets  $A \subseteq \Theta$ The degrees of belief P :  $2^{\Theta} \rightarrow [0, 1]$  are required to satisfy the Kolmogorov axiom

There are good arguments for this choice, e.g. the Dutch Book argument

For **finite**  $\Theta$ , probability function  $P : 2^{\Theta} \rightarrow [0, 1]$  must satisfy

i) 
$$0 \le P(A) \le 1$$
 for all events  $A \subseteq \Theta$ ,  
*ii*)  $P(\Theta) = 1$ ,  
*iii*) if  $A \cap B = \emptyset$ , then  $P(A \cup B) = P(A) + P(B)$  for all A, B

Consider the subjective statement: "The ship is in ca or rd or ld with degree of certainty 0.6, that's all I know"

A modelling with probility theory forces the user to specify the degrees of belief for all elementary events. In this case the experts does not want to that. Equal probabilities for rd and ld and equal probabilities for the remaining options are often used. But this is a very precise option that doesn't reflect the state of the knowledge (namely ignorance) of the expert.

An alternative solution is to assign beliefs directly to subsets and not to elements, i.e to use mass distributions. Recall example with  $\Omega = \{z3, z2, z1, ca, rd, Id\}$ 

Propositional statement *in port* equals event {*ca*, *rd*, *ld*} Event may represent maximum level of differentiation for expert

Expert specifies mass distribution  $m: 2^{\Omega} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ 

Here,  $\boldsymbol{\Omega}$  is called frame of discernment

$$egin{aligned} m:2^\Omega &
ightarrow [0,1] ext{ must satisfy} \ (\mathsf{i}) & m(\emptyset) = \mathsf{0}, \ (\mathsf{ii}) & \sum_{\mathcal{A}:\mathcal{A}\subseteq\Omega}(\mathcal{A}) = 1 \end{aligned}$$

Subsets  $A \subseteq \Omega$  with m(A) > 0 are called **focal elements** of *m* 


m(A) measures belief committed *exactly* to AFor *total* amount of belief (**credibility**) of A, sum up m(B) whereas  $B \subseteq A$ 

For maximum amount of belief movable to A, sum up m(B) with  $B \cap A \neq \emptyset$  (plausibility)

This leads to belief function and plausibility function

$$\begin{array}{lll} \mathsf{Bel}_m : & 2^\Omega \to [0,1], & \mathsf{Bel}_m(A) & = \sum_{B:B \subseteq A} m(B) \\ \mathsf{Pl}_m : & 2^\Omega \to [0,1], & \mathsf{Pl}_m(A) & = \sum_{B:B \cap A \neq \emptyset} m(B) \end{array}$$

If the evidence tells us that the truth is in *A*, and  $A \subseteq B$ , we say that the evidence supports *B*.




 Given a normalized mass function m, the probability that the evidence supports B is thus

$$Bel(B) = \sum_{A \subseteq B} m(A)$$

 The number Bel(B) is called the degree of belief in B, and the function B → Bel(B) is called a belief function.

### Belief and Plausibility

If the evidence does not support  $\overline{B}$ , it is consistent with B.



 The probability that the evidence is consistent with B is thus

$$PI(B) = \sum_{A \cap B \neq \emptyset} m(A)$$
$$= 1 - Bel(\overline{B}).$$

 The number *PI(B)* is called the plausibility of *B*, and the function *B* → *PI(B)* is called a plausibility function. Consider statement: "ship is *in port* with degree of certainty of 0.6, further evidence is not available"

Mass distribution  $m: 2^{\Omega} \rightarrow [0, 1], m(\{\text{in port}\}) = 0.6, m(\Omega) = 0.4, m(A) = 0$  otherwise  $m(\Omega) = 0.4$  represents inability to attach that amount of mass to any  $A \subset \Omega$ 

*e.g.*  $m(\{in port\}) = 0.4$  would exceed expert's statement

Function  $Bel : 2^{\Omega} \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is a completely monotone capacity: it verifies  $Bel(\emptyset) = 0, Bel(\Omega) = 1$  and

$$Bel\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^{k} A_{i}\right) \geq \sum_{\emptyset \neq I \subseteq \{1,...,k\}} (-1)^{|I|+1} Bel\left(\bigcap_{i \in I} A_{i}\right).$$

for any  $k \ge 2$  and for any family  $A_1, \ldots, A_k$  in  $2^{\Omega}$ .

Conversely, to any completely monotone capacity *Bel* corresponds a unique mass function *m* such that:

$$m(A) = \sum_{\emptyset \neq B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A| - |B|} Bel(B), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega.$$

Let *m* be a mass function, *Bel* and *Pl* the corresponding belief and plausibility functions

For all  $A \subseteq \Omega$ ,

$$Bel(A) = 1 - Pl(\overline{A})$$
$$m(A) = \sum_{\emptyset \neq B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A| - |B|} Bel(B)$$
$$m(A) = \sum_{B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A| - |B| + 1} Pl(\overline{B})$$

m, Bel and Pl are thus three equivalent representations of

- a piece of evidence or, equivalently
- a state of belief induced by this evidence

In any case  $Bel(\Omega) = 1$  ("closed world" assumption)

**Total ignorance** modeled by  $m_0 : 2^{\Omega} \to [0, 1]$  with  $m_0(\Omega) = 1$ ,  $m_0(A) = 0$  for all  $A \neq \Omega$ 

 $m_0$  leads to  $\mathsf{Bel}(\Omega) = \mathsf{Pl}(\Omega) = 1$  and  $\mathsf{Bel}(A) = 0, \mathsf{Pl}(A) = 1$  for all  $A \neq \Omega$ 

For ordinary probability, use  $m_1 : 2^{\Omega} \to [0, 1]$  with  $m_1(\{\omega\}) = p_{\omega}$  and  $m_1(A) = 0$  for all sets A with |A| > 1

 $m_1$  is called Bayesian belief function

Exact knowledge modeled by  $m_2 : 2^{\Omega} \rightarrow [0,1], m_2(\{\omega_0\}) = 1$  and  $m_2(A) = 0$  for all  $A \neq \{\omega_0\}$ 

When the focal sets of *m* are nested:  $A_1 \subset A_2 \subset ... \subset A_r$ , *m* is said to be consonant

The following relations then hold

 $PI(A \cup B) = \max(PI(A), PI(B)), \quad \forall A, B \subseteq \Omega$ 

*PI* is this a possibility measure, and *BeI* is the dual necessity measure The possibility distribution is the contour function

 $\pi: \Omega \rightarrow [0, 1], \pi(\omega) = P/(\{\omega\})$ 

The theory of belief function can thus be considered as more expressive than possibility theory (but the combination operations are different, see later).  $\pi: \Omega \rightarrow [0, 1], \pi(\omega) = \mathsf{PI}(\{\omega\})$ 

Thus, possibility measure and necessity measure are defined by

$$poss_m : 2^{\Omega} \to [0, 1], \quad \Pi_m(B) = max\{\pi(\omega) : \omega \in B\}$$
$$nec_m : 2^{\Omega} \to [0, 1], \quad nec_m(B) = 1 - \Pi(B)$$

i)  $\Pi(\emptyset) = 0$ 

- ii)  $\Pi(\Omega) = 1$
- iii)  $\Pi(A \cup B) = \max\{\Pi(A), \Pi(B)\}$  for all  $A, B \subseteq \Omega$

Possibility of some set is determined by its "most possible" element  $\operatorname{nec}(\Omega) = 1 - \Pi(\emptyset) = 1$  means closed world assumption: "necessarily  $\omega_0 \in \Omega$ " must be true Total ignorance:  $\Pi(B) = 1$ ,  $\operatorname{nec}(B) = 0$  for all  $B \neq \emptyset, B \neq \Omega$ Perfect knowledge:  $\Pi(\{\omega\}) = \operatorname{nec}(\{\omega\}) = 0$  for all  $\omega \neq \omega_0$  and  $\Pi(\{\omega_0\}) = \operatorname{nec}(\{\omega_0\}) = 1$  Simple Example

Consider ship locations again Given membership function

$$\pi(z3) = \pi(z2) = 0$$
  

$$\pi(z1) = \pi(ld) = 0.3$$
  

$$\pi(ca) = 0.6$$
  

$$\pi(rd) = 0.1$$


 $\Pi(\{z3, z2\}) = 0 \text{ and } \operatorname{nec}(\{z1, ca, rd, ld\}) = 1$ 

We know it is impossible that ship is located in  $\{z3, z2\}$ 

 $\Pi(\{ca, rd\}) = 1, nec(\{ca, rd\}) = 0.7$  means "location of ship is possibly but not with certainty in  $\{ca, rd\}$ "

### Possibility and Fuzzy Sets

Let variable T be temperature in  $^{\circ}C$  (only integers) Current but unknown value  $T_0$  is given by "T is around  $21^{\circ}C$ "



Incomplete information induces possibility distribution function  $\pi$  $\pi$  is numerically identical with membership function Nested  $\alpha$ -cuts play same role as focal elements


#### Definition

Let  $\Omega$  be a (finite) sample space. A **possibility measure**  $\Pi$  on  $\Omega$  is a function  $\Pi : 2^{\Omega} \rightarrow [0, 1]$  satisfying

- i)  $\Pi(\emptyset) = 0$  and
- ii)  $\forall E_1, E_2 \subseteq \Omega : \Pi(E_1 \cup E_2) = \max{\Pi(E_1), \Pi(E_2)}.$

From axioms, it follows  $\Pi(E_1 \cap E_2) \le \min\{\Pi(E_1), \Pi(E_2)\}$ Attributes are introduced as variables (as in probability theory)  $\Pi(A = a)$  is abbreviation of  $\Pi(\{\omega \in \Omega \mid A(\omega) = a\})$ If event *E* is possible without restriction, then  $\Pi(E) = 1$ If event *E* is impossible, then  $\Pi(E) = 0$ 


### Example: Dice and Shakers



numbers	degree of possibility
1 – 4	$\frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} = 1$
5 – 6	$\frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} = \frac{4}{5}$
7 – 8	$\frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} = \frac{3}{5}$
9 - 10	$\frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} = \frac{2}{5}$
11 – 12	$\frac{1}{5} = \frac{1}{5}$

Example

#### Example Domain




- 10 simple geometrical objects, 3 attributes.
- One object is chosen at random and examined.
- Inferences are drawn about the unobserved attributes.


#### Relation

color	shape	size
	$\bigcirc$	$\operatorname{small}$
	$\bigcirc$	medium
	$\bigcirc$	$\operatorname{small}$
	$\bigcirc$	$\operatorname{medium}$
	$\bigtriangleup$	$\operatorname{medium}$
	$\bigtriangleup$	large
		$\operatorname{medium}$
		$\operatorname{medium}$
	$\bigtriangleup$	medium
	$\bigtriangleup$	large


# Example: Reasoning

- Let it be known (e.g. from an observation) that the given object is green. This information considerably reduces the space of possible value combinations.
- From the prior knowledge it follows that the given object must be
  - $\circ~$  either a triangle or a square and
  - $\circ\,$  either medium or large.






## Example:Possibility Distribution



Numbers state degrees of possibility of corresponding value combination

### Example: Reasoning



From the information, that the object is green, we can derive information obout the possibilities of shape and size. For high dimensional possilities the complexity can be handled by using information about (conditional) independences

#### Definition

Let  $\Omega$  be a (finite) sample space,  $\Pi$  a possibility measure on  $\Omega$ , and  $E_1$ ,  $E_2 \subseteq \Omega$  events. Then  $\Pi(E_1 | E_2) = \Pi(E_1 \cap E_2)$  is called the **conditional possibility** of  $E_1$  given  $E_2$ .

#### Definition


Let  $\Omega$  be a (finite) sample space,  $\Pi$  a possibility measure on  $\Omega$ , and A, B, and C attributes with respective domains dom(A), dom(B), and dom(C). A and B are called **conditionally possibilistically independent** given C, written  $A \perp \perp_{\Pi} B \mid C$ , iff


 $\forall a \in \operatorname{dom}(A) : \forall b \in \operatorname{dom}(B) : \forall c \in \operatorname{dom}(C) :$  $\Pi(A = a, B = b \mid C = c) = \min\{\Pi(A = a \mid C = c), \Pi(B = b \mid C = c)\}$ 

#### **Possibilistic Networks**

Example: Decomposition of a 21-dim possibility distribution by using independences between lower dimensional possibility distributions.

The (hyper-) graph visualized the independence structure by separation properties in the graph, and this representation allows efficient reasoning and learning methods in high dimensional problems.





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